WORKING AS A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY
There are three titles to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Title I covers employment, Title II covers public entities and Title III covers public accommodations.
In order to be an individual with a disability under the ADA, an individual must be substantially limited in a major life activity and all three titles list “working” as a major life activity.
The actual language in the regulations defines major life activities as functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
However, some of the federal courts have recently questioned whether “working” is a major life activity under the ADA.
In Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), the Supreme Court held that:
Because the parties accept that the term “major life activities” includes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations. We note, however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining “major life activities” to include work, … Id. at 492.
Also, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002), the Supreme Court held that:
Because of the conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that working could be a major life activity, we have been hesitant to hold as much, and we need not decide this difficult question today. Id. at 200.
In analyzing Sutton, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that:
The Supreme Court has questioned, in dicta whether “working” should be considered a major life activity under the ADA. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). … In Sutton, the Court entertained on the merits the plaintiffs’ claim that they were substantially limited in the major life activity of working, but remarked that “there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining major life activities to including working and has suggested that working be viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last resort ‘[i]f an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity.’” (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1998) (emphasis added by Court). The Court did not, however, rule on whether an individual’s relative inability to work constitutes a disability under the ADA because that issue was not disputed by the parties. See Burns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 255 n.4 (2000).
But, under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Supreme Court has specifically held that:
Congress plainly intended the Act to cover persons with physical or mental impairment (whether actual, past, or perceived) that substantially limited one’s ability to work. [T]he primary goal of the Act is to increase employment of the handicapped. Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, 456 U.S., at 633, at n. 13, 104 S.Ct. at 1254, at n. 13; see also id., at 642, 104 S.Ct. 1253 (“Indeed, enhancing employment of the handicapped was so much the focus of the 1973 legislation that Congress the next year felt it necessary to amend the statute to clarify whether § 504 was intended to prohibit other types of discrimination as well”). See School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283, at n. 10, 104 S.Ct. at 1129, at n. 10, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987).
And, under the ADA, the Supreme Court held that Congress adopted a specific statutory provision in the ADA directing as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et. seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title. Citing 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631-632, 118 S.Ct. § 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998).
The directive requires us to construe the ADA to grant at least as much protection as provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act. Bragdon v. Abbott, Id. at 632.
Moreover, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that:
Congress drew the ADA’s definition of disability almost verbatim from the definition of “handicapped individual” in the Rehabilitation Act, § 706(8)(B), and Congress’ repetition of a well-established term generally implies that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations. Id. At 193-194. (Citing Bragdon v. Abbott, Id. at 631).
Therefore, the courts should follow School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, Bragdon v. Abbott and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky v. Williams and hold that “working” is a major life activity under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
It is interesting to note that John G. Roberts, Jr., the present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, represented the petitioner in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky v. Williams.
The statutes and regulations cited above can be accessed at http://www.law.cornell.edu
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